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Abstract 
 
 
The shortages of entrepreneurial skills have lowered search effectiveness of potential young 
entrepreneurs and the rate of youth start-ups. Our paper contributes to closing a gap in the 
entrepreneurship and development literature with a model of costly firm creation and skill 
differences between young and adult entrepreneurs. The model shows that for young 
entrepreneurs facing high costs of searching for business opportunities, support for training is 
more effective in stimulating productive start-ups than subsidies. The case for interventions 
targeted at youth rises in societies with high costs of youth unemployment. We test the role of 
skills and training for productive youth entrepreneurship on data from a recent survey of 
entrepreneurs in Swaziland.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For the past decade, Swaziland, as most of the other middle income countries in Southern Africa 
(e.g., Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa) has been among the slow growing economies 
on the continent. With high unemployment and youth unemployment, inclusive growth in the 
region has remained elusive (Jauch, 2011; Ncube et al., 2014). Despite the oversized public 
sectors, the overall employment has been low, reflecting limited private sector job creation and 
entrepreneurship, both in the formal and informal sector. The countries were also negatively 
impacted by the global financial crisis, either through trade with Europe – directly (South 
Africa), via South Africa (Lesotho and Swaziland) – or through fall in commodity export 
proceeds (Botswana, Namibia).  
 
In Southern Africa middle income countries, with low job creation and demographic pressures, 
youth unemployment is a major challenge. In Swaziland, the share of youth in the working age 
population (15 – 64) in 2010 reached 43%, above the regional peers. Currently, youth 
unemployment rate exceeds 50% of the youth labor force and is among the highest in Africa. 
Further, a substantial portion of youth has been discouraged from participating in the labor 
markets. The labor markets were a key channel in transmitting the 2011-2012 fiscal crisis to 
households. Since many of the factors that could unlock the employment potential of the youth 
are also on the demand side of the labor market, private sector development, including youth 
entrepreneurship, can be part of the solution (Brixiová and Kangoye, 2014).
2
 
 
Besides macroeconomic environment, the literature on causes of high youth unemployment 
identifies the following main factors: (i) demographic changes (Korenman and Neumark, 2000); 
(ii) individual human capital (O’Higgins, 2001); (iii) family background and networks, i.e. social 
capital (Coleman, 1988); (iv) structural changes and characteristics of specific economies 
(Peterson and Vroman, 1992); and (v) skill and geographical mismatches (Elhorst, 2003). While 
poor macroeconomic performance and shocks to aggregate demand are often considered a key in 
the developed economies, long-standing structural bottlenecks, especially to private sector 
development and productive entrepreneurship, are often emphasized in developing countries.  
 
The importance of productive entrepreneurship for development and differences in type of 
entrepreneurship across countries were already underscored in Baumol (1968 and 1990).
3
 Since 
then, the literature on entrepreneurship has grown markedly (please see Acs and Audertsch, 
2003; Parker, 2009 for overview). In the context of Africa, Rogerson (2001) showed that low 
productivity entrepreneurship has been highly prevalent in the region, but productive 
(opportunity) entrepreneurship has been mostly missing. At the same time, theoretical analysis of 
factors impacting entrepreneurship in developing countries and in particular Africa has been 
relatively scarce. The literature in this area includes Leff (1979); Gelb et al., (2008); Naude 
(2008 and 2010); Baumol (2010); and Brixiova (2010 and 2013) among others.  
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 A nationally representative survey carried out in Swaziland in November 2011 found that 7.3 % of households had 
at least one member who lost job during 2011 fiscal crisis (UN Swaziland, 2012). 
3
 In this paper we define entrepreneurship as in Naudé (2010) to be ‘…the resource and process whereby individuals 
utilize opportunities in the market through the creation of new business firms.’ 
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In this paper, we examine barriers to youth entrepreneurship in an extended framework of 
Brixiová et al. (2009) of costly firm creation and skill acquisition by workers, which accounts for 
differences in skills among entrepreneurs. We particularly focus on the lack of skills among 
young entrepreneurs that prevents them turning a perceived business opportunity into a firm.
4
 
Specifically, we develop a model of costly entrepreneurial start-ups, where youth are less skilled 
than adults. We then consider policy options for removing impediments to youth 
entrepreneurship and show how targeted support to entrepreneurial training or stat up subsidies 
can narrow the gap in productive entrepreneurship between youth and adults. The results are 
supported by empirical analysis of data from the 2013 UN survey of entrepreneurs in Swaziland.  
 
Our research takes place at the time of heightened interest among African researchers and 
policymakers to unlock the employment potential of youth. With tight fiscal conditions in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, new jobs in the region are unlikely to be generated by the 
public sector. Entrepreneurship is then viewed as an option for generating sustainable 
livelihoods. In fact, with their ability to adapt to changes and innovate, young people have the 
potential to drive tech-entrepreneurship and growth (Lisk and Dixon-Fyle, 2013).  
 
In Swaziland, as elsewhere, potential young entrepreneurs are constrained the most by the lack of 
entrepreneurial skills and the limited access to finance/start-up capital. The few existing 
entrepreneurship programs are not always well-tailored to their needs. The Government has 
taken steps to address these constraints, but such initiatives would need to be scaled up and 
linked with better incentives to help reduce youth unemployment.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some of the key constraints to 
entrepreneurship in developing countries and to youth entrepreneurship in Swaziland. Section 3 
develops model of entrepreneurship and structural change, with focus on shortages of 
entrepreneurial skills and start-up capital. Options to address the youth disadvantages in business 
start-ups such as government support for training and start-up capital are then analysed. Section 
4 tests the results of the model with new data from Swaziland. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Stylized facts on constraints to youth entrepreneurship 
 
2.1 Constraints to entrepreneurship in developing countries 
 
Numerous factors constrain entrepreneurship across developing countries. Besides well-studied 
access to credit for the established SMEs, key for start-ups appears to be the regulatory 
framework and the business environment, the initial capital, and entrepreneurial skills (Figure 1).  
For example, according to the World Bank (2013), in Southern Africa the existing SMEs viewed 
access to finance as the top constraint (29.1 percent of respondents), followed by crime and  
 
 
                                                 
4
 As the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor and the IDRC report states: ‘The ability of an entrepreneur to go from an 
idea to the commercialization of a business based on this idea requires particular competencies (knowledge, 
experience and skills). These may be developed through formal education in grade school or university courses, 
informal methods like books or websites, or training programs offered by private or government sources. Such 
education is critical to the initial success and sustainability of any enterprise (Herrington and Kelley, 2012; page 46). 
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Figure 1. Factors of entrepreneurship in developing countries 
 
Figure 1a. New firm entry and quality of regulations, 2004 - 2011 
 
Figure 1b. New firm entry and cost of start-ups, 2004 - 2011
 
 
Figure 1c. Innovation and education index, 2012
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Bank Doing Business (2013), KAM, Entrepreneurship and 
Governance databases.  
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corruption. Workforce skills were also viewed as important, constituting a major constraint for 
more than 16 percent of SME respondents.
5
  
 
Among various constraints, access to credit has been well studied (Li, 1998; Aghion et al., 2007). 
The lack of skills on the side of workers in developing countries has been also recognized and 
covered (Brixiova et al., 2009). In this paper, we thus focus on skill shortages of entrepreneurs.  
 
2.2 Constraints of young entrepreneurs in Africa  
 
With relatively weak growth prospects of the middle income countries in Southern Africa and 
especially in Swaziland, solutions to youth labor market challenge relying only on the supply 
side will not be effective. While entrepreneurship alone cannot tackle youth employment 
challenge, it can be an important part of the response. We now highlight some key constraints 
faced by young entrepreneurs in Africa, as covered in the literature. 
 
Schoof (2006) examined a range of key constraints that impede young people in different 
countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, from starting a successful business, while also 
identifying incentives and measures to tackle these barriers. The study confirmed the need to 
differentiate between youth and adult entrepreneurship, stemming from unique constraints and 
greater barriers that young people face as a result of their limited resources and experiences. 
Entrepreneurial education, access to start-up capital and business provider services were found 
among the key factors impeding youth entrepreneurship, alongside societal attitudes and a 
regulatory framework. The importance of capacity building was underscored in the ILO report 
by Chigunta et al. (2005), which studied youth entrepreneurship in Eastern and Southern Africa.  
 
  2.3 Characteristics and constraints of young Swazi entrepreneurs  
 
Survey of young urban entrepreneurs
6
 
 
In November 2012, the UN Swaziland surveyed over 600 entrepreneurs in urban Swaziland. It 
relied on the face-to-face interviews in Hhoho and Manzini regions.
7
 The sampling frame was 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) listed in the 2011 SME directory of the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Trade (provided by the SME Unit). Using this frame, all firms listed in 
the major six cities that provided their full addresses were selected for interviews.
8
  
                                                 
5
 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2012) outlines the Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions – that is factors 
that have a significant impact on the entrepreneurship sector. These factors include financial market sophistication, 
technology, development, higher education and training, and labor market efficiency. Our focus is on skills. 
6
 Constraints for rural entrepreneurs are left to further research. Given Swaziland’s small size, the distinction 
between rural and urban entrepreneurs is blurred as people from rural areas often commute to cities on daily basis. 
7
 The choice of urban areas was informed by the evidence from 2007 and 2010 labor force surveys, which revealed 
that the ratio of youth to adult unemployment was particularly high (almost triple) in urban areas compared to rural 
areas. Manzini and Hhoho regions were selected as areas where most entrepreneurial activities have been 
concentrated and for their potential to generate positive spillovers to the rest of the country. 
8
 This choice implied that new and very small firms as well as those that outgrew the ‘SME status’ or are not listed 
in the directory and operating more informally may be systematically underrepresented. To partly correct for this 
bias, a large number of enterprises were interviewed (relative to the population in selected areas). 
6 
 
The survey covered young and adult entrepreneurs to understand differences between these 
groups in terms of personal characteristics, skills, social networks, values and views on the 
constraints they face.
9
 Among the 640 entrepreneurs interviewed, 255 were classified as young 
(i.e. ages 18 – 35) and 385 as adult (above 35 years of age). Young and adult entrepreneurs with 
similar demographic and social characteristics (gender, sector of operation) were chosen to learn 
about the differences age introduced to the entrepreneurial experience in Swaziland’. Among 
sectors, services, especially trade, were the main area of entrepreneurs’ activities.  
 
The interviews aimed to obtain information about the entrepreneurs’ background, objectives of 
the firms they run and the constraints they encounter most frequently. The survey also collected 
data on the main characteristics of the enterprise (years of operations, sector, employment and 
turnover). The questionnaire concluded with a section on entrepreneurs’ recommendations for 
policymakers and financial institutions.  
 
Table 1. Differences between young and adult entrepreneurs in Swaziland, 2012 
  All entrepreneurs Young entrepreneurs 
 
Young 
15 - 35 
Adult 
36 and 
above 
SE and 
stat. sign. 
15 - 
29 
30 - 
35 
SE and 
stat. 
sign. 
   (in % of total entrepreneurs unless otherwise indicated) 
Education and experience 
      
Age of entrepreneur (years) 30.3 47.1 0.57 *** 26.7 32.8 
0.25 
*** 
Age of business (years) 4.1 7.2 0.57 *** 3.7 4.5 0.4 * 
Higher education 35.3 48.3 3.97 *** 33.0 36.8 6.12 
Received formal business training 18.4 26.5 3.40 ** 12.6 22.4 4.93 ** 
Prior work experience 37.8 57.8 4.01 *** 32.0 41.6 6.26 
Resolve/Commitment 
      Hours of work (per week) 39.3 42.3 1.70 * 39.5 39.2 2.78 
Operating at full capacity (months) 9.5 10.4 0.14 *** 9.1 9.8 0.5 
Involved in job search 26.1 9.2 2.9 *** 35.6 19.6 5.6 *** 
Would accept job offer 35.3 17.9 3.4 *** 38.8 32.9 6.1 
If fails would start another firm 52.2 55.1 4.02 46.6 55.9 6.37 
Outcomes 
      Firm stable or growing 60.0 69.9 3.81 *** 56.3 62.5 6.26 
Sales (monthly, E thousand) 1/ 71.2 110.1 76.2 13.1 110.9 75.6 
Sales same or higher than last year 34.5 37.7 3.89 37.8 32.2 6.08 
Turnover (monthly, E thousand) 1/ 138.7 354.7 79.7 *** 85.9 174.1 61.7 
Employment (av. 2012) 1.8 2.4 0.38 1.3 2.1 0.38 ** 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2013 UN Swaziland survey. 1/ E stands for emalangeni (local currency). *, 
**, and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
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 The survey adopted approach of Djankov et al. (2005) and incorporated questions from three perspectives on 
factors impacting entrepreneurship: (i) institutions; (ii) social networks and (iii) personal traits of entrepreneurs.  
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Table 1 reports some findings from the survey, focusing on personal traits of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial outcomes. We first cover differences in means between young (15 – 35) and 
adult (36 +) entrepreneurs. The mean age of young entrepreneurs was 30.3 years, while that of 
adult entrepreneurs 47.1 years. Regarding experience in the same firm, the businesses of young 
entrepreneurs were 4.1 years old on average, relative to 7.2 years of those of adults. While only 
one third of young entrepreneurs had higher education, but almost half of adult the adults did. 
Similarly, less than 1 out of 5 young entrepreneurs received business training, while more than 1 
out of 4 adults was trained. Only 38 percent of young entrepreneurs had prior work experience, 
relative to 58 percent of adults. All these indicators thus point to skill disadvantage of youth.  
 
The indicators of effort/commitment – hours of work, operating at full capacity, involvement in 
search for another job, etc. – portrait adult entrepreneurs as putting in more effort into their 
businesses than youth. Finally, adults outperform youth on all indicators of outcomes – sales, 
turnover, employment and prospects. 
 
Focus group discussions with young entrepreneurs 
 
To gain better understanding of constrains perceived by young – actual and potential (including 
students) – entrepreneurs in Swaziland, UNDP Swaziland undertook focus group discussions 
(FGDs) with young Swazi entrepreneurs during September—December 2012. The participants 
were also asked to provide solutions to challenges they identified. Opinions on how to create 
enabling entrepreneurship framework conditions, especially for youth, were sought. While the 
results of the FGDs are only indicative, they provide the following useful insights.  
 
 Young Swazi entrepreneurs viewed the lack of skills (including work experience) and 
finance as top barriers to start ups. University students thought that the entrepreneurship 
classes overemphasize concepts, while not equipping them with the ‘know-how’ to start 
and run a business. In their view, training programs should go beyond business plan 
preparation and foster linkages to business service providers and networks.  
 
 Young people were also concerned about not having a say in policies ‘promoting’ their 
economic interests, including entrepreneurship, partly due to traditional decision-making 
structures. Development programs for youth thus often fail to meet young people’s needs. 
 
 A weak business environment also impedes young Swazi entrepreneurs. Such barriers 
impact youth disproportionally because of their lack of experience in overcoming them 
and the limited links to professional networks. Further on the business environment, the 
limited access to finance for start-up capital, which reflects young people’s limited assets 
for collateral and the absence of financial history, is an important constraint.  
 
 Youth viewed professional networks as critical to enter sectors other than those with ‘low 
barriers/high competition.’ Access to information on business opportunities was also a 
priority and so was supportive infrastructure such as incubators for youth business ideas.  
 
8 
 
Overall, the findings of the FGDs confirmed the gap in entrepreneurial skills and training programs 
to be an important hindrance for youth business start-ups, alongside the lack of the initial capital:
 10
   
 
2.4 Measures to stimulate youth entrepreneurship 
  
While entrepreneurship as an academic field is relatively new, the link between human capital 
and productive entrepreneurship has been long posited in the theoretical and empirical literature 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Evans and Leighton 1989; McPherson 1996; and Chigunta et al., 2005).  
Recognizing the importance of human capital and skills in self-employment and 
entrepreneurship, governments in Africa and elsewhere have increasingly turned to 
‘entrepreneurship programs’. The programs vary in objectives, types of interventions, and 
implementation arrangements, reflecting constraints to entrepreneurship they tend to address.  
 
Results of the entrepreneurship programs also vary widely, with similar programs yield different 
outcomes in different places and for different groups (McKezie and Woodruff, 2014). Among 
recent research, Klinger and Schündeln (2014) found that in Central America, business training 
significantly increases the probability that a participant starts a new business or expands an 
existing one. Utilizing a randomized experiment, Mano et al. (2012) found that basic-level 
management training improves business practices and performance in Ghana. Gindling and 
Newhouse (2014) documented that in low income countries, effective targeting of training 
programs to the self-employed with higher growth potential is important. It is noteworthy though 
that the positive impacts on both labor market and business outcomes were found to be 
significantly higher for youth than for adults (Cho and Honorati, 2014).
11
 
 
In an effort to support youth entrepreneurship, the Government of Swaziland established the 
Youth Enterprise Fund (YEF) in 2009, to provide training and start-up capital for emerging 
young entrepreneurs. However, the program ran into difficulties in 2011 and 2012, due to fiscal 
constraints on new funding and low repayment rates on the existing loans. While in principle this 
initiative is a step in a right direction, substantial scaling up and better repayment other 
incentives would be needed to achieve meaningful reduction in youth unemployment.
12
  
 
TechnoServe Swaziland, NGOs supporting entrepreneurship, provides youth with training, 
networks and seed capital.
13
 As TechnoServe, Junior Achievement Swaziland (JASD) focuses on 
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 The FGDs were a qualitative exercise, carried out with active and potential young entrepreneurs (students). 
Interviews with key stakeholders in the public sector (e.g., Ministry of Economic Development; Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry, Youth Enterprise Fund), the private sector (e.g., NedBank, FINCORP) and NGOs 
(e.g., TechnoServe, JASD) were carried out to triangulate the dialogue (UNDP Swaziland, 2012). 
11
 Evaluations of Latin America’s programs targeted to vulnerable youth pointed out effectiveness of vocational and 
life skills training combined with internships in private firms (Attanasio et al., 2011; Card et al., 2011).  
12
 The 2011 fiscal crisis has further undermined the YEF financing with low repayment rates and inadequate 
support from the government. The low repayment rates were mostly a result of disbursed funds not being adequately 
monitored and of weaknesses in the YEF’s business proposal assessment process (UN Swaziland, 2013). The Youth 
Enterprise Development Fund in Kenya has also experienced massive loan defaults, with many youth enterprises 
performing well below their potential (Rori et al., 2011). Oseifuah (2010) posits that training in the financial literacy 
and entrepreneurship skills has a positive impact on growth of youth SMEs in South Africa.  
13
 Since access to credit is a key obstacle for young entrepreneurs who lack collateral and are considered ‘high risk’ 
because of their limited business experience, TechnoServe also launched a loan guarantee facility that was taken up 
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capacity development of potential entrepreneurs. The JASD conducts courses for high school 
students on entrepreneurship and financial literacy, drawing on partners from the private sector, 
education institutions and the Government. While such initiatives can play a catalytic role, 
fragmentation limits their effectiveness. Swaziland still needs to develop a comprehensive youth 
employment and entrepreneurship strategy for integrating young people into the labor market. 
 
International experiences show that youth entrepreneurship training programs can form 
successful government interventions, provided that necessary preconditions (e.g. time limit, 
targeting) are in place.  In the next section, we develop a model reflecting these facts, conduct 
policy analysis and test the results on new data from Swaziland. 
 
3. The model 
 
Reflecting the above facts, we develop a model of entrepreneurial start-ups in an economy with 
limited entrepreneurial skills, costly search for business opportunities and costly start up (i.e. 
requiring initial capital). This is a model of structural transformation, where both young and 
adult entrepreneurs face skill shortages, but the shortages are more pronounced among youth.
14
 
 
With their lack of work and entrepreneurial experience, weak links to professional networks, and 
limited start-up capital and access to credit, young entrepreneurs face higher cost than adults 
when searching for opportunities and turning them into businesses. For young entrepreneurs the 
skill shortages can be explained by the lack of experience while in the case of adults they reflect 
the need to move to a new productive sector.
15
 The model is applied to analyze policies to 
stimulate start-ups by subsidizing entrepreneurial training/search or start up. The efficiency–
equity trade-offs involved in promoting youth vs. overall entrepreneurship are also examined.  
 
Consider a one-period economy with the population size normalized to one. There are two types 
of agents, entrepreneurs and workers, with population shares   and 1  , respectively. 
Furthermore, a portion 1-p of both entrepreneurs and workers are adults and portion p are young 
people. All agents receive w  amount of consumption good, c, from their domestic or informal 
sector production. They have risk neutral preferences in consumption )(cE where E denotes the 
expectations agents form at the beginning of the period about the income they will receive from 
their activities. Young entrepreneurs are ‘less skilled’ than their adult counterparts and thus face 
more challenges to find viable business opportunities/ turn them into firms.
16
 
 
At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs search for opportunities to open firms and incur 
cost equal to iii xxd 2/)(
2 , where YAi , for adults and youth, respectively and  is a search 
efficiency parameter that takes on two values: Y for the young entrepreneurs (that is with 
                                                                                                                                                             
by Standard Bank and Nedbank Swaziland. More recently, the Nedbank extended credit under the Central Bank of 
Swaziland guarantee scheme, conditional on training from the Swazi Small Enterprise Development Company. 
 
15
 In the Southern Africa context, due to the adjustment of the size of the public sector, the former public sector 
employees would need to gain new skills either to be employed or run their own firm in the private sector.  
16
 This assumption also reflects the mismatch that exists between the skills supplied by the current educational 
system and those demanded in the private sector, putting premium on work experience.  
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probability p ) and A with probability 1-p, where 0 YA  . The difference in search 
efficiency reflects the differences between young and adult entrepreneurs in their initial skill 
levels, with youth being less able to search for opportunities and turn them into firms than 
adults.
17
 The search results in probability ix  , YAi , of opening a business, which – after paying 
start -up cost k, then produces output y using n  amount of labor as follows: 
 




 1
1
1
nzy           (1)  
 
where z is the business capital and  , 10  , is the share of capital in the output. With 
entrepreneurs paying workers a market-determined (competitive) wage w , each entrepreneur 
running a firm earns profit amounting to 




 



 11
11
1
nzwnnz . The market 
clearing condition for entrepreneurs is umm   where m is aggregate the number of 
entrepreneurs who run a business and um are entrepreneurs who did not find a business 
opportunity to open a business become self-employed in the informal sector and earn income b.  
 
At the beginning of the period, workers acquire skills for the private sector at a cost of
2/)( 2qqk  , with 0 .  Workers’ learning efforts result in probability q  , of obtaining skills 
and job in the private sector at wage w , which reflects their marginal product of labor.18 
Denoting N as the total labor working in the private sector (e.g., nmN  ), the market clearing 
condition is uNN 1 , where uN  are the unemployed.
 
  
 
3.1 Agents’ problem and the equilibrium 
 
The entrepreneur of type AYi , , where Y  denotes young and A  denotes adult, solves: 
 
max )( icE    
s.t. 
i
i
iii
x
bxxwc


2
)1(
2
         (2) 
 
Similarly, the representative worker solves: 
 
max )(cE    
s.t. 
2
2q
qwwci            (3) 
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 The model could be applied to other groups with skill shortages (e.g. people in rural areas).  
18
 Unlike entrepreneurs, young and adult workers face the same cost of acquiring skills. The case of differences 
among workers is elaborated in Brixiová et al. (2009).  
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The equilibrium is a wage rate and an allocation of workers and entrepreneurs such that (i) 
entrepreneurs and workers maximize their utilities and (ii) labor and output markets clear so that 
 AY xppxxm )1(    holds for entrepreneurs and qN )1(   for workers.
19
  
 
3.2 Decentralized solution 
 
Solving the utility maximization problems of entrepreneurs and workers and substituting from 
the labor market clearing condition mnN   yields: 20 
 
b
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)1(
          (5) 
 
where AY xppxx )1(  is the average search effort and AY pp  )1(   is the average 
search cost of young and adults. From (4), the entrepreneurs’ search effort for a business 
opportunity, ix , is positively related to net profits, b , and search efficiency: i , i = Y, A. For 
a given level of profits young entrepreneurs who face high search cost due to their skill shortages 
are less likely to search and more likely to work in the informal sector than their adult 
counterparts.  Conversely, when search for opening businesses is less costly (or subsidized, as 
discussed below), entrepreneurs will increase their search effort (x rises with ).  
 
Equations (4) and (5) also show interdependency between (i) the number of firms and workers’ 
effort to acquire skills and (ii) the availability of skilled workers and entrepreneurs’ search effort.  
Specifically, a lower number of searching entrepreneurs reduces the expected wage and 
discourages workers to acquire skills needed in the private sector. Conversely, shortages of 
skilled workers discourage entrepreneurs from searching for productive business opportunities 
where such workers are needed.  
 
3.3 Standard optimal solution 
 
The standard approach to derive the optimal solution is to maximize utility derived from 
consumption (in this case from maximizing output) by solving the social planner’s problem:21 
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 Based on the parameters, the model either has (i) a unique trivial equilibrium where workers and entrepreneurs 
exert zero effort or (ii) one trivial and one unique equilibrium with positive effort by workers and entrepreneurs. We 
focus on the unique equilibrium with positive workers’ and entrepreneurs’ efforts. 
20
 Disaggregating by age, AY mmm   and uAuYu mmm  , where YY xpm  and AA xpm )1(  . 
From nmN   follows that 
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
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)1( 
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 In the past, in practice the focus on welfare maximization through raising consumption/output has often 
manifested itself by policymakers’ focus on high growth. This approach, which does not take into account inequality 
and hence inclusiveness or sustainability, can be problematic, as discussed below.  
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In solution to (6), the condition for optimal effort by workers to acquire skills remains identical 
to (5), but (4) now changes to: 
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From (4) and (7), the solution to the social planner’s problem and in the decentralized economy 
would be identical if b = 0.
22
 However, with a positive level of income from the informal sector 
b > 0 as in the benchmark decentralized case, incentives for entrepreneurs to search for business 
opportunities are reduced. This also lowers the equilibrium private sector employment relative to 
the outcome in the social planner’s problem (Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 2. Decentralized and social planner’s solution 
 
Source: Authors´ calculations.  
 
3.4 Policies to stimulate entrepreneurship  
 
Subsidies to start up  
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 In fact, if the social planner would include output in the informal sector, b, in the objective function, the 
decentralized and the optimal solutions would be identical. Not including b in the objective function is consistent 
with the goal to promote ‘good’ – high productive, secure and well-paid – jobs.    
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We now discuss how can policies such as subsidizing the entrepreneurial start-ups through 
encouraging search efforts offset the disincentives created by the informal sector income. 
Specifically, we assume that subsidy per entrepreneur takes form sxi . The entrepreneur of type i 
solves (8a) with solution described by (8b) and (5): 
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Equation (8b) shows that under the above forms of financing, the subsidy per worker could 
exactly offset the expected disincentive effect from the income in the informal sector, that is
bs  . It is straightforward to show that financing the subsidy from profit taxation would be 
much less effective than for example consumption taxation, since higher profit tax rate would 
work in the opposite direction of the subsidy, offsetting its impact. In economies with severe 
shortages of productive entrepreneurship, such as Swaziland, tax base should be broadened and 
taxation should shift, where possible, to other sources away from firm profits. 
 
 
 
Support to entrepreneurship training programs 
 
The government can support entrepreneurship with training. Participation in such programs 
lowers entrepreneurs’ income from the informal sector by a fraction   and also reduces the rate 
of search cost (or raises search efficiency) by a fraction )1,0( . With this type of support, the 
problem of an entrepreneur i is described by (9a), while the solution is characterized by (9b) and 
again (5): 
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Based on (9b), the increase in search efficiency resulting from entrepreneur’s participation in 
retraining programs amounting to xb /  would offset the disincentives arising from the 
informal sector income. Effectiveness of this measure will depend on how the entrepreneurship 
training programs – if sponsored by the government – are being financed. Again, cuts in non-
priority expenditures or increases in rates of less distortionary taxes (lump-sum, consumption) 
would be a preferred option to profit or income taxation.  
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Comparing the cost of reaching optimal solution under the two subsidy schemes shows that when 
efficiency of search is relatively low (search effort high), it is preferable to support training 
programs reducing entrepreneurial search cost rather than simply subsidize existing search. 
Given the relatively low search efficiency of youth, this points to the importance of their 
training.  
 
3.5 Considering equity between young and adult entrepreneurs  
 
While the solution to the social planner’s problem maximizes the aggregate output and 
consumption, it does not take into account inequalities between young and adult entrepreneurs 
that may arise. These inequalities can constitute another reason for public interventions.  
 
As already mentioned, young people in most sectors (with the possible exception high-tech 
sectors) are disadvantaged relative to adults when looking for entrepreneurial opportunities. To 
reflect this observation in our model, young people incur higher search cost for business 
opportunities than adults, that is AY  0 .  Subsequently, the solution to the decentralized 
problem characterized by (4) and (5) will result in a larger share – relative to the relevant labor 
force – of potential young entrepreneurs failing to find a suitable business opportunity than is the 
case for adult entrepreneurs ( AY mm  ).  
 
When ‘optimal’ government policies target only output and thus output-maximizing solutions are 
adopted, the government would provide identical subsidy s=b to young and adult entrepreneurs 
or reduce their search cost by the same fraction through training. Under such measures, 
inequalities between the two groups would not be eliminated or even narrowed. 
 
What subsidies to entrepreneurial search could then government provide so as to put search 
effort of youth on equal footing with that of adult entrepreneurs?  Conditions (4) and (5) show 
that when the government subsidizes search of adult entrepreneurs by the amount b, the equal 
search effort of young entrepreneurs would be achieved through subsidy to young entrepreneurs 
that exceeds b, bsY  , amounting to:  
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where 0 bss AY since YA   .  
To ensure that the government-sponsored entrepreneurial training programs equalize search 
efforts of young and adult entrepreneurs, youth should be prioritized for the training, so that its 
efficiency of search converges to that of adults. The following condition needs to hold: 
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15 
 
It follows from (11) that since YA   , the government needs to sponsor training for young 
entrepreneurs so that their search effectiveness rises more than that of adults: AY   .
23
  
 
3.6 Optimal solution with social costs of (youth) unemployment 
 
Besides the standard social planner’s problem described by (6), the optimal solution also depends 
on the objectives that the society sets for itself.  When only output (or utility) maximizing 
solutions are adopted, other priorities such as income distribution, low unemployment and 
inclusiveness can be compromised. However, high growth with widespread unemployment point 
to exclusive development path, which is typically not sustainable. 
  
Protracted unemployment or idleness can lead to ‘scarring’, that is the impairment of their 
employment and income prospects through low wages; underemployment, and; low-pay-no-pay 
cycles, and the loss of human capital. Negative consequences of youth underutilization extend 
well-beyond economic well-being. For example, social exclusion is an important negative 
consequence of youth unemployment and idleness. The young people miss out on critical life-
skill building experiences such as applying their knowledge, developing a sense of own abilities  
autonomy as well as contributing meaningfully to society (Khumalo, 2011).  
 
We now modify the objective function (6) to show a situation where the society assigns social 
cost to unemployment. The social planner’s objective function then changes to: 
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where )()( xAmA    is cost of unemployment; with m denoting entrepreneurs who 
did not open a productive business firm and are unemployed/in the informal sector. Solution to 
(12) is characterized again by (5), but (7) now changes to: 
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Hence introducing social costs raises the entrepreneurial effort needed to reach optimal (social 
planner’s) solution. For example, start-up subsidy would now need to offset also social cost of 
unemployment, Abs  .  
 
Since we are interested in youth entrepreneurship, we now look into the case where the society 
assigns social costs to youth unemployment only. In this situation, problem (12) becomes:  
                                                 
23
 Where possible, these government interventions should be financed through lump sum-like taxation (e.g., real 
estate) or with taxes on consumption (e.g., VAT).  
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where )()( YY pxpAmpA    is social cost of youth unemployment; with Ymp  denoting 
young entrepreneurs /working in the informal sector. First order conditions replacing (7) are:  
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 (15a) 
Conditions (15) with (13) show that the optimal entrepreneurial effort rises when the society 
assigns social costs to all unemployed entrepreneurs. At the same time, higher social costs 
related to youth unemployment give justification to interventions that are targeted at this age 
group (Figure 3). For example, when social costs A are assigned to the unemployed young 
entrepreneurs, their optimal start up subsidy would rise to Abs   for youth but remain bs   
for the adults.
24
  
Figure 3. Optimal search with and without youth unemployment cost 
 
Note: E(1) is the decentralized equilibrium, E(2) is the social planner’s solution when social cost of youth 
unemployment are not taken into account and E(3) is the optimal solution with youth unemployment cost. 
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 In contrast, when social costs are related to all unemployed entrepreneurs, the optimal solution would be reached 
with uniform subsidy s = b+A to all entrepreneurs.    
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4  Empirical Evidence from Swaziland 
 
4.1 Kernel density estimate of entrepreneurial sales 
 
In this section, we compare some of the results of our model with data from a recent (2013) 
survey of Swazi entrepreneurs. In particular, examine if skills and training for young 
entrepreneurs impact positively their performance, measured by sales. Figure 4 illustrates the 
sales distribution of adult and young entrepreneurs. Both distributions are nearly uni-modal, with 
adult entrepreneurs outperforming the youth except for the relatively very high sales range. We 
then ask if training would improve the sales performance of youth. Figure 4b shows that relative 
to the ‘no-training’ case almost entire probability density function would move to right if all 
youth were trained.  
 
Figure 4. Kernel density estimate of probability density function of sales 
 
Figure 4a. Kernel density of entrepreneurial performance: youth vs. adults 
 
 
Figure 4b: Kernel density of youth entrepreneurial performance: training vs. no training 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNDP Survey of Young Entrepreneurs. Note: Sales in a regular month. 
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4.2 Results of probit estimations 
 
Finally, we test which of the characteristics of young entrepreneurs impact their sales 
performance in a multivariate probit regression. We find that firms where young entrepreneurs 
received more business training performed better than those with less training. Male 
entrepreneurs and Swazi citizens also recorded better sales performance during the past two 
years than their counterparts.  At the same time, the impact of formal education, while positive, 
is not significant suggesting that formal education may not provide skills needed for productive 
entrepreneurship (Table 2).  
 
Our model and empirical results suggest that targeted government interventions can help youth 
overcome numerous obstacles for productive entrepreneurship. The results underscore the need 
for policy interventions to go beyond improving the business environment to more pro-active 
measures. In particular the governments could consider assistance to young entrepreneurs 
through business training and other interventions for start-ups to even their chances of 
entrepreneurial success with those of adults. 
 
Table 2. Firm sales performance and skills: probit estimations 
Dependent var.: sales are flourishing 
(=0 if decreasing or stagnating; =1 if 
flourishing - 2 years ago -) 
(1) (2) 
   
Received business training 0.194** 0.199** 
 (0.0905) (0.0923) 
Age of business (log) 0.00515 0.00346 
 (0.0621) (0.0628) 
Age -0.0248* -0.0281* 
 (0.0146) (0.0150) 
Informal source of initial capital 0.0767 0.0422 
 (0.0925) (0.0962) 
Applied for formal credit 2/ 0.0649 0.0505 
 (0.114) (0.119) 
Number of employees (log) 0.0482 0.0144 
 (0.0673) (0.0688) 
Secondary 0.0714 0.0480 
 (0.113) (0.113) 
University 0.0356 0.00346 
 (0.147) (0.144) 
First business handled 0.162 0.180* 
 (0.119) (0.0946) 
gender  -0.170* 
  (0.0888) 
married  0.0332 
  (0.0923) 
nationality  0.215*** 
  (0.0756) 
Observations 102 102 
R-square 0.0599 0.1025 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UNDP Swaziland (2013) survey of entrepreneurs. Note: Probit model and 
variables are specified in Annex I. 2/ Many applications for formal credit are turned down.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we developed a model of costly firm start up, where young entrepreneurs 
experience greater shortages of entrepreneurial skills than adults. They thus face more challenges 
turning their ideas into businesses. To derive policy recommendations we utilized the model for 
analysis of the impact of the government support to entrepreneurial training and subsidies to start 
up, while taking into account equity considerations. The model shows that targeted support to 
entrepreneurial training can lead to more efficient outcome than the decentralized solution and 
reduce the gap in productive entrepreneurship between the two cohorts. In particular when search 
efficiency is relatively low (and search effort high), it is preferable to support training programs 
to reduce entrepreneurial search cost rather than simply subsidize their existing efforts. The 
importance of skills and training is confirmed by our empirical analysis of a new survey of Swazi 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Findings of our model and the evidence from Swaziland need to be put into context with 
experiences of other countries and regions with programs supporting youth entrepreneurship. 
Among various types of support, entrepreneurial education and training have becoming more 
prevalent. While results of these training programs vary, targeting high potential youth and 
providing packages of reforms (for example, supplementing access to credit with training) seems 
to have yielded better results than widely spread support containing a single measure (credit). 
The design of interventions should be adjusted to country-specific conditions and further 
researched.  
 
By focusing on training and start up subsidies we have left other constraints to youth 
entrepreneurship such as youth low participation in professional networks or the lack of 
supportive infrastructure (incubators) for further research. More broadly, the area of effective 
government policies fostering productive youth entrepreneurship in Africa is relatively 
understudied. Further research in this area could also explore the role of African youth in 
technology adoption and innovation as well as different policies that the African governments 
could adopt towards high potential and vulnerable youth groups.   
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Annex I. Probit Estimations –Model and Variables 
 
Table 1, Annex I. Variables used in probit estimations 
Dependent variable Definition Comment 
Sales performance Dummy variable indicating whether total current sales have been 
decreasing or stagnating (=0), or have been flourishing as compared 
with sales 2 years ago 
Proxy of performance 
Controls   
First business handled Dummy variable indicating whether the business is the first one to be 
handled by the interviewee entrepreneur 
Proxy of the experience in business 
management 
Age of business (log) Log of the age of business in age Proxy of the experience in business 
management (this assumes a stable 
ownership) 
Highest education: 
secondary/high school 
Dummy variable indicating whether the highest education level 
attained in the secondary/high school level 
Proxy of education 
Highest education: university Dummy variable indicating whether the highest education level 
attained in the university level 
Proxy of education 
Received business training Dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneurs has ever 
received a formal, informal, advanced business training or has simply 
been introduced to business or nor. 
Proxy of business skills 
Age Age in years Entrepreneurs’ socio-economic 
characteristics 
Gender (=1 if female) Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for female entrepreneurs and 0 
for male entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs’ socio-economic 
characteristics 
Married Dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur is married or 
not. 
Entrepreneurs’ socio-economic 
characteristics 
Nationality Dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur has the Swazi 
citizenship or not. 
Entrepreneurs’ socio-economic 
characteristics 
Number of employees (log) Log of the total current number of employees Business characteristics 
 
The following probit model has been used: 
 
Salesi= α + β[Experience] i + γ[Education] i + δ[Skills] i + λ[Business characteristics] i + ν[Socio-
economic characteristics] I + ηi 
 
where i stands for individual entrepreneurs. The dependent variable (Sales) takes on value 1 when 
the total sales have increased or 0 when they stagnated/decreased relative to sales two years ago. 
Experience is proxied by the age of business and whether this is the first business managed; 
Education is proxied by the highest level of education attained; Skills are proxied by the business 
training received; Business characteristics is proxied by the number of employees; Socio-
economic characteristics,used as controls, are proxied by age, gender, marital status and 
nationality. 
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